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We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other 
player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation 
requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal 
to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price 
for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for 
example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners. 
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 1 Introduction
It is quite common that public goods can be provided by only one party,
where coordination takes place in a noncooperative fashion. Such a situation
may arise, for example, if a ﬁrm can reduce pollution, if a region provides
goods but cannot exclude its use by inhabitants from neighboring regions, if
a country takes measures against climate change, if an individual decides on
household production in a partnership, etc. This paper addresses the ques-
tion under which circumstances an eﬃcient provision of the public good is
achieved in a noncooperative framework where unconditional transfers be-
tween players are possible.
We analyze a game between two players in which the second player pro-
duces a public good. The ﬁrst player can aﬀect the decision of the second
player by making an unconditional transfer. According to the reaction func-
tion of the second player, the ﬁrst player perceives a (marginal) personal price
of the public good. In this framework, it is shown that public good provision
satisﬁes the Samuelson eﬃciency rule if and only if the sum of the price of
the public good for the second player and the perceived price of this good
for the ﬁrst player add up to the resource cost. This summation property is
known from the Lindahl equilibrium in which all agents unanimously prefer
the same level of the public good at personalized prices. However, in the
textbook Lindahl model eﬃciency is lost when moving to a sequential game
structure (Myles, 1995). The Lindahl equilibrium can be implemented, how-
ever, when agents announce subsidy rates for contributions of others before
the provision decisions are taken (Danziger and Schnytzer, 1991; Althammer
and Buchholz, 1993; Varian, 1994).
A second interesting property of the eﬃc i e n ts o l u t i o ni st h a tt h ep e r c e i v e d
price of the public good for the ﬁrst player will under mild conditions always
exceed the price of the second player. As these two prices have to add up to
the resource cost to restore eﬃciency, the personal price of the second player
has to fall short of half of the resource cost.
1An important application of the analysis above is found in labor supply
decisions when couples do not coordinate their actions and where the sec-
ond player is identiﬁed as the secondary earner, producing a public good
with leisure, as in the model of Meier and Rainer (2010). The public good
production is modeled as the mirror of the labor supply decision, where the
price for player 2 is his or her net wage. Our results then have the following
implications. Achieving an eﬃcient allocation requires that the price of the
public good for player 2 plus the perceived price for purchasing units of this
good of player 1 have to add up to the resource cost, which is the gross wage
or the marginal productivity of labor of player 2, the secondary earner. As
the perceived price of player 1 will generally exceed the net wage of player 2,
this net wage has to fall short of half of the corresponding gross wage, im-
plying a marginal tax rate above 50%. This results stands in stark contrast
to the mainstream literature on the optimal design of household taxation,
stressing welfare losses due to high tax rates on additional wage income by
secondary earners as their labor supply elasticities tend to be comparatively
large (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983).
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. After introducing
the model in Section 2, ﬁrst-best allocations and equilibrium outcomes are
characterized in Section 3. The main results on the Lindahl property and the
price structure for achieving a ﬁrst-best allocation are collected in Section
4. The concluding Section 5 indicates possibilities for extensions and further
applications.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider two individuals consuming a public good g and a private good c.
Preferences of individual i ∈ {1,2} are given by a quasi-concave utility func-
tion Ui(ci,g) with strictly positive marginal utilities, where ci and g denote
the quantities consumed of the private and the public good, respectively. The
private good can be transformed into the public good at a unit cost p. The
2sequence of events is as follows. At the outset, the incomes of the individ-
uals, M1 and M2, and the price player 2 faces for producing or purchasing
the public good, p2, are common knowledge. Player 1 then selects an un-
conditional nonnegative transfer θ to player 2. Having received the transfer,
player 2 chooses the level of the public good g.
3 First-best allocations and equilibrium out-
come
The overall resource constraint is c1 + c2 + pg ≤ M, where M represents
aggregate income of the two players.












with α>0 and λ denoting the Lagrange multiplier. In any interior solution,
the ﬁrst-order conditions imply the Samuelson rule, stating that the sum of
the marginal rates of substitution betwen the public and the private good















The decentralized equilibrium can be found through solving by backward
induction. Player 2 maximizes U2(c2,g) subject to M2 + θ ≥ c2 + p2g.
The optimization leads to the familiar equality between the marginal rate of







Given an interior solution, the reaction of player 2 to an increase of the

















In the preceding stage, player 1 chooses the transfer θ ≥ 0 so as to maximize
U1(c1,g(θ)) subject to the budget constraint M1 − θ − c1 ≥ 0. In case of an
interior solution of the transfer, the marginal rate of substitution between
the public and the private good will be equal to the inverse of the reaction
term ∂g/∂θ, which can be interpreted as the perceived price of the public










4 Decentralization of the ﬁrst-best: Lindahl
property
Proposition 1 states that decentralizing the ﬁrst-best allocation requires the
Lindahl property: The sum of the price of the public good of player 2 and
the perceived prive of player 1 have to add up to the resource cost.
Proposition 1 In case of interior solutions for θ and g, the private provision
o ft h ep u b l i cg o o dw i l lb ee ﬃcient if and only if
p
1 + p
2 = p. (6)
Proof. An eﬃcient allocation requires (2). The claim then follows im-
mediately from (3) and (5). ¤
Interestingly, an eﬃcient allocation requires the Lindahl property al-
though the noncooperative framework with the transfer is quite diﬀerent
from the well-known Lindahl game. Moreover, in Lindahl’s framework of
voting on the preferred level of the public good at individualized prices, a se-
quential game structure would destroy eﬃciency. In that event, player 1, by
taking into account the reaction curve of the player 2, will no longer equate
4the marginal rate of substitution with the personal relative price level. Nev-
ertheless, our framework bears some similarities with the Lindahl game. The
equilibrium looks as if both players choose the same level of the public good.
The second proposition concerns the relation of the two prices in equi-
librium. If both goods are normal from the point of view of player 2, the
perceived price of the public good for player one will always exceed the price
player 2 faces.





gc > 0,t h e np1 >p 2.
Proof. Notice that U2
cc(p2)2 + U2
gg − 2U2
gcp2 ≤ 0 is necessary to satisfy
the second-order condition to the optimization problem of player 2, where
we may ignore the case that the condition only holds with equality. Further,












If both goods are normal, that is, associated with a strictly positive income
elasticity, we have U2
gg − U2
gcp2 < 0 and U2
ccp2 − U2
gc < 0, implying p1 >p 2.¤
Proposition 2 is easily understood, If both goods are normal, the demand
for the public good by player 2 increases, but only part of the transfer will
be spent on this good. Therefore, the public good will turn out to be more
expensive from the point of view of player 1 in comparison to the situation in
which he can directly buy these units at the price p2. Recalling Proposition 1,
this implies that achieving an eﬃcient allocation requires that the personal
price of the second player falls short of half of the resource cost.
5 Concluding discussion
Of course, it may be perceived as restrictive that only player 2 can produce
the public good. Clearly, if player 1 has also some technology to produce it at
5price p0, he will refrain from production if the perceived price for purchasing
units from player 2 falls short of this cost, p1 <p 0. If on the other hand,
we have p0 <p 1, there will be no transfer to player 2, that is, θ =0 . It will
often turn out that production of the public good will be chosen either only
b yp l a y e r1o ro n l yb yp l a y e r2( s e eM e i e ra n dR a i n e r ,2 0 1 0 ) .
Externality problems between ﬁrms can also lead to the structure ana-
lyzed above if more speciﬁc contract clauses cannot be enforced. For example,
a polluting ﬁrm may be interested to reduce its level of pollution due to its
positive impact on public opinion, where employing ﬁlter technologies reduce
the proﬁt. Another ﬁrm is harmed by this pollution, but can only make an
unconditional transfer to the ﬁrst ﬁrm. If the government cannot make use
of a Pigouvian tax, an appropriate level of the proﬁtt a xm a yb ee m p l o y e d
for implementing an eﬃcient level of pollution by implicit Lindahl pricing.
In negotiations on climate change, the framework of the game seems quite
realistic. Further examples of applications may be found in foreign aid if a
developing country produces a global public good, or in similar interregional
or international voluntary transfer schemes. However, implicit Lindahl pric-
ing can be implemented for many of these problems only if a central authority
exists, because otherwise the country or region that produces the public good
has to face its full marginal cost.
References
Althammer, W. and W. Buchholz (1993), Lindahl equlibiria as the outcome
of an non-cooperative game. European Journal of Political Economy
9, 399—405.
Boskin, M. and E. Sheshinski (1983), The optimal tax treatment of the
family. Journal of Public Economics 20, 281-297.
Danziger, L. and A.Schnytzer (1991), Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-
exchange mechanism. European Journal of Political Economy 7, 55—64.
6Meier, V. and H. Rainer (2010), On the optimality of joint taxation for
non-cooperative couples. CESifo Working Paper No. 3128, Munich.
Myles, G. D. (1995), Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Varian, H. R. (1994) Sequential contributions to public goods. Journal of
Public Economics 53, 165—186.
7